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Abstract 
This paper describes recent trends on the efficiency of stabilisers in the European 
Union. Using both macro evidence on the cyclical sensitivity of budget deficit to 
economic activity, and micro evidence on the tax and expenditure profiles, we 
conclude, in agreement with the recent literature, that the importance of automatic 
stabilisation has decreased. After remarking that this trend is contradictory with the 
current economic institutions of Europe relying exclusively on automatic 
stabilisation for the conduct of fiscal policy, we argue that increasing flexibility, one 
alternative way to reduce cyclical fluctuations, does not seem a viable path. The 
paper concludes defending the appropriateness of discretionary fiscal policy. We 
argue by means of a simple model that the theoretical arguments against its use are 
not conclusive, and we describe a recent stream of literature, based on structural 
VAR models, that concludes rather robustly for the effectiveness of discretionary 
fiscal policy in the short and long run.  
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1. Introduction 
The economic institutions of Economic and Monetary Union in their actual design stem 
from two main sources. The first is the founding Treaty signed in Maastricht in 1991, and 
the second is the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, that completed the setup with the Stability 
and Growth Pact (hereafter SGP). 
The Maastricht Treaty defined the convergence criteria that countries had to fulfil in 
order to be admitted to the single currency area. In particular, it required a deficit to GDP 
ratio of no more than 3%, and a public debt below 60% of GDP, or approaching that level 
at a satisfactory pace.  
The Amsterdam Treaty contains further provisions regarding fiscal policy that have the 
objective of increasing transparency and control on public finances. The Stability and 
Convergence Programmes that each year Member States present to the Commission have 
to contain a medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close to balance or in 
surplus, together with an account of the adjustment path towards the objective. The 
Excessive Deficit Procedure states what deviations from the 3% budget deficit ceiling are 
acceptable and describes the sanctions for the violators. As of December 2007, no 
country has been fined, although disapproval of budget positions in some countries has 
been expressed. 
The prolonged period of low growth experienced by most Euro area countries (especially 
the largest ones), and the increasing number of countries struggling to maintain their 
deficits within the limits set by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), have triggered a 
debate on the flaws of the current fiscal framework, and on possible reforms aimed at a 
better functioning of fiscal policy in Europe2. The reform adopted by the European 
Council in March 2005 relaxes somewhat the medium term objective of a zero structural 
deficit for countries with low debt and/or with high potential growth; furthermore, it 
contemplates a number of circumstances (e.g. a strong engagement in costly structural 
reforms) allowing temporary deviations from the deficit ceiling, and longer delays for 
correcting them. 
                                                 
2 For detailed accounts of the debate on reforming the Pact, see e.g. Arestis et al., (2001), Buti et al., 
(2003), Creel et al., (2002), Farina and Tamborini, (2007), Fitoussi and Le Cacheux, (2007), Mathieu and 
Sterdyniak, (2003), Monperrus-Veroni and Saraceno, (2005). 
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The requirement to attain a position of close to balance or surplus in the medium term is 
an important innovation of the SGP with respect to the Maastricht Treaty, and it was left 
substantially unchanged by the reform of 2005. In fact, it implies the strong consequence 
that public debt as a ratio to GDP should tend asymptotically to zero, a position hard to 
justify per se (De Grauwe, 2003).  
Even after the reform of 2005, the focus of the Stability and Growth Pact has been on the 
full operation of automatic stabilisers which would allow the implemention of a counter-
cyclical short run fiscal policy. However, recent assessments of fiscal policies in the EU-
15 have either pointed to their a-cyclicality (Gali and Perotti, 2003) or to their pro-
cyclicality (Farina and Ricciuti, 2006). This raises doubts about the effectiveness of 
automatic stabilisers all over Europe. In the first part of the present contribution, we 
support this conclusion with a variety of stylised facts related either to the tax and benefit 
systems or to the sensitivity of unemployment public expenditures to unemployment and 
GDP growth rates. We then argue that a contradiction has arisen in Europe between the 
fact that the SGP advocates the use of automatic stabilisers and the reality of their 
declining effectiveness.  
A subsequent step will consist in analysing possible solutions to the contradiction. Two 
situations are possible: further reducing the scope of fiscal policy and making the EU 
economy depend even more on markets and their flexibility; or making room in the 
European fiscal framework for discretionary and counter-cyclical fiscal policies to 
compensate for the reduction in the efficiency of automatic stabilisers3. We argue in 
favour of the latter solution. 
The standard textbook consensus on which rest the European economic institutions is that 
monetary policy is assigned the task of reacting to area wide shocks, while national fiscal 
policy is left in charge of country specific shocks4. Within this framework, fiscal policy 
has to be limited to automatic stabilisation, banning discretionary intervention from the 
toolbox of policy interventions. The standard argument maintains that the limit of total 
                                                 
3 A third proposition could be to rebuild the effectiveness of the automatic stabilisers (Solow, 2004), but 
their effectiveness has been deteriorating so much over the years in Europe that a dramatic U-turn is needed 
to compensate. Moreover, time elapsed before automatic stabilisers become effective again will be very 
long. Implementing discretionary fiscal policies may give quicker results.  
4 While it is not the main subject of this essay, it is nevertheless worth mentioning the inconsistency of 
the framework, which leaves to monetary policy the task of reacting to common output shocks, while at the 
same time explicitly limiting its mandate to inflation targeting (article 4, comma 2 of the Treaty). This 
leaves in fact an objective (reaction to common output shocks) without assigned instruments. 
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deficit to 3 percent, coupled with the requirement of structural balance, could avoid fiscal 
indiscipline (thus protecting central bank independence), while letting enough room for 
automatic stabilisation to take care of country specific shocks. (Brunila et al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, some empirical studies (see, e.g., Barrell and Pina, 2004) discussed the fact 
that the initial levels of debt-to-GDP ratios and cyclically-adjusted deficits in some Euro 
area Member States might be too high to permit the automatic stabilisers to operate freely 
within the constraints of the SGP.  
2. The Decreasing Effectiveness of Automatic Stabilisers in the EU-15 
The European framework for fiscal policy has tended to privilege the operation of 
automatic stabilisers at the expense of discretionary policy changes. Distinguishing 
between the cyclical and the structural parts of a public deficit is not an easy task. Even 
abstracting from the difficulties involved in the measurement of the output gap and 
potential output, automatic stabilisers depend on a variety of factors from the macro and 
the micro spheres that are often country specific. The effectiveness of automatic 
stabilisers depends on the sensitivity of government revenues and spending to economic 
fluctuations and on the sensitivity of economic activity to cyclical changes in government 
revenues and spending. Among the factors affecting budgetary sensitivity, the literature 
highlights the size of the public sector, the progressivity of the tax and benefit system, the 
sensitivity of tax bases to economic fluctuations, the institutional time profile of the tax 
system5, the level of unemployment benefits and the sensitivity of unemployment to 
fluctuations in economic activity. Other determinants have an influence on the 
effectiveness of automatic stabilisers: the nature and size of shocks. Finally, the overall 
flexibility of the economy may also dampen the shocks and automatic stabilisers may 
seem more effective than they are in reality.  
Despite the difficulty of identifying the relative smoothing properties of automatic 
stabilisers and economic flexibility, the picture in the European context shows some key 
elements whose incidence on the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers presents no 
ambiguity: budgetary sensitivity has undoubtedly been on a downward trend for many 
years and recent reforms (e.g., the recent fiscal package approved by the newly elected 
                                                 
5 By this we mean that automatic stabilisers are more effective if e.g. main tax revenues come from 
taxes which are very sensitive to economic fluctuations and whose lags are short. For example, corporate 
taxes have generally been very sensitive to the economic cycle but delays in collection have reduced the 
overall effectiveness of this tax as a prominent automatic stabiliser.  
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French government) are not such that one can expect a reverse trend in the near future. 
This long lasting change therefore questions the exclusive reliance of European fiscal 
policies on automatic stabilisation.  
1.1. Automatic stabilisers: Macro evidence 
We begin with a summary, in table 1, of the main conclusions of different 
macroeconometric models that estimate the percentage of fluctuations in output which 
are smoothed by automatic stabilisers. The most striking result is the heterogeneity of 
countries in terms of the sensitivity of economic activity to the cyclical changes in 
government revenue and spending. The standard error across countries goes from 2 to 
8%, for an average smoothing of 19% across models and countries. Moreover, the extent 
of automatic stabilisers smoothing for a country is quite different from one model to the 
other and the standard errors across models are large, ranging from 6% for Germany to 
12% for the Netherlands.6 Overall, table 1 tells us that the scope of automatic stabilisers 
in the EU is low: at best, they smoothed a maximum of 36% of economic fluctuations 
and at worst only 5% of them.  
To complement the studies mentioned in table 1 we give our own preliminary assessment 
of the size of automatic stabilisers in 5 countries between 1971 and 2005. These countries 
are representative of the size heterogeneity of the Euro area Member States and they will 
also be shown later to have behaved distinctly with respect to the progressivity of the tax 
and benefit system. We focus on the sensitivity of public deficit (our endogenous 
variable) with respect to economic fluctuations (one-quarter lagged GDP growth). We 
report two different OLS specifications: one with a lag in fiscal policy and one without 
(columns 2 and 1 of table 2 respectively), the former giving a better fit. A first 
noteworthy pattern is the heterogeneity across countries, which confirms the findings of 
table 1. Crossing the results of the two tables we are able to obtain additional 
information, most notably about the comparison between UK and France. While table 1 
displayed a relatively high smoothing of economic fluctuations in the UK, table 2 shows 
that the overall sensitivity of public deficit to economic fluctuations is similar. This may 
lead to conclude that automatic stabilisers are more efficient in the UK than in France. 
                                                 
6 Contrary to the other studies, the one based upon NiGEM introduces rational expectations by 
households on future fiscal policy. In this context which draws heavily on some sort of Ricardian 
equivalence, it is normal that the effectiveness of fiscal policy is small.  
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Table 2 also shows that cyclical sensitivity of the public deficit is very strong in Sweden, 
mild in the Netherlands and weak in France and the UK. In Italy, GDP growth shows the 
wrong sign whatever the specification used. In this country fiscal policy is highly inertial: 
one explanation may be related to the high level of debt and to the ensuing burden of 
interest payments on Italian public finances. Another explanation is the very low level of 
unemployment related expenditure, which in Italy has always been largely below 1% of 
GDP (see figure 5). In the other four countries, the inertial component is comparable. 
Lastly, the cyclically-adjusted deficits, captured by the constant term, are also very 
comparable across countries except Italy.  
To assess the stability of specification (2), we performed a CUSUM test (Brown et al., 
1975) on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals. The test finds parameter 
instability of the regression if the cumulative sum goes outside the area between the two 
5% critical lines. Figure 1 displays the results. Italy and France witnessed some 
instability in the coefficients, between 1985 and 1991 in the former and between 1993 
and 1995 in the latter. For both countries, the improvement in the specification which 
occurred after these respective phases came to an end soon afterwards, although 
instability was not significant. In the Netherlands and the UK, the macro evidence 
reported in specification (2) was never significantly unstable, although the fit was 
continuously deteriorating from 1975 to 1990. For the UK, a new deterioration occurred 
between 1995 and 2000, around the implementation of the new fiscal rules. Finally, the 
specification for Sweden seems fairly stable.  
These results confirm that macro evidence regarding automatic stabilisers is fairly robust 
across the time sample and it is possible to conclude that the homogeneity of imposed 
fiscal rules within the EU is contradictory with the heterogeneity of empirical rules since 
the 1970s.  
1.2. Recent changes in revenue and expenditure trends: Micro evidence 
The working of automatic stabilisers rests predominantly on the size of the public sector, 
on the structure of the tax and benefit systems and on the level of unemployment benefits 
and their sensitivity to economic fluctuations. The evolution of these factors is described 
in the next subsections. 
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1.2.1. The size of the public sector 
With a sample of 20 OECD countries, Fatas and Mihov (2001) showed that government 
size and the volatility of the business cycle were negatively correlated; they concluded 
that larger governments had more efficient automatic stabilisers: the fact that 
expenditures or taxes were independent of the economic cycle was in itself a stabiliser 
because it was reducing volatility in the economy. Government size was measured by the 
ratio of public expenditures or tax revenues to GDP.  
Table 3 displays the level and evolution of government size in 6 EU countries. A first 
striking result is the decrease in the discrepancy across countries, measured by the 
standard error: between 1980 and 2006 it was reduced by 32% for total expenditures, and 
by 47% for total revenues. The second important result is that the Netherlands, UK, 
Sweden and Germany have rather substantially reduced the size of their governments. 
For these countries, and following Fatas and Mihov (2001), it can be concluded that 
automatic stabilisers are today less effective than in the past. An opposite conclusion 
holds for France and Italy, for which government size has been on an upward trend.  
1.2.2. The progressivity of the tax and benefit system 
The progressivity of the tax and benefit system is meant to help an economy tackle ups 
and downs. A progressive tax system, including a generous transfer system, dampens the 
cycle: during the upturns, an increase of average income increases the average tax rate, 
thus reducing disposable income and cooling off aggregate demand. Symmetrically, 
during a slump, the decrease of income will entail a lower average tax rate, and hence a 
less than proportional decrease in disposable income, thus sustaining demand.  
If, in addition, the cycle impacts differently on different income brackets (in particular, if 
expansions benefit the wealthiest the most), a progressive tax rate both reduces income 
inequalities and improves economic stabilisation: during an upswing, the wealthiest pay 
relatively high taxes whose revenues help to reduce possible past deficits; they also 
improve future fiscal leeway. Meanwhile, the poorest pay relatively low taxes that help 
their disposable income converge towards that of the wealthiest. During a downswing, 
the more progressive the tax system, the highest the decrease in taxes paid by the 
wealthiest and the more the tax system helps to counterbalance the crisis. We can broadly 
speaking attribute two distinct (even if often related) objectives to a tax and benefit 
system: improving the situation of the poorest, on the one hand; and making the 
wealthiest contribute more to welfare and social expenditure, on the other hand. 
 9
Since the end of the 1990s, there has been a sharp modification in the tax and benefit 
systems of the EU-15 countries: In many of them the redistributive role of the system has 
been attenuated, while at the same time top marginal tax rates were reduced.  
Aggregate data at the EU-15 level tell a mixed story. Between 1998 and 2001 
(comparable data are not available for other years), the distribution of disposable income7 
remained constant, the three first deciles receiving 14% of total disposable income, the 
next four 35%, and the highest income groups more than 50%. A comparison of 
interdecile ratios for disposable and pre-tax incomes shows instead that the EU-15 
underwent a small change between 1998 and 2001: table 4 shows that the benefit and tax 
systems permitted a reduction in inequality between Decile 5 and Decile 1 of 43.7%8 in 
1998, but only of 42.0% in 2001. In the meantime, redistribution between Decile 10 and 
Decile 5 was more substantial in 2001 than in 1998.  
Here we are confronted with a specific feature of some European tax and benefit systems: 
For the EU-15 as a whole, the capacity of the system to redistribute between the 
wealthiest and the middle income deciles has increased, while redistribution between the 
latter and the poorest income earners has been reduced. Figure 2 can be illustrative in 
this respect. On the x-axis, a positive value means that the relative situation of households 
from Decile 1 has deteriorated vis-à-vis that of Decile 5 between 1998 and 2001. On the 
y-axis, a positive value means that the relative situation of households from Decile 5 has 
deteriorated vis-à-vis that of Decile 10 during the same time span. If the two above-
mentioned objectives are reached by a country (we label it Regime 1), both values should 
be negative. In the case where one out of the two is reached, one value is negative 
whereas the other is positive: Regime 2 holds when the poorest and the wealthiest are 
favoured at the expense of middle-income earners; Regime 4 holds when the situation of 
middle-income earners improves vis-à-vis the poorest and the wealthiest. Last, Regime 3 
holds when the situation of the wealthiest improves vis-à-vis low-income and middle-
income earners.  
Data for EU-15 countries show that few of them have actually reached both objectives 
over this short period; Denmark, France, Ireland and the UK are in the same quadrant as 
                                                 
7 Disposable income is original income (from employment, investment, private pension) minus taxes 
plus received benefits, from maternity allowances to public pensions.  
8 In 1998, for the EU-15 countries on average, the ratio of Decile 5 to Decile 1 original income was 
equal to 473%; with disposable income data, it was equal to 266%. Thus, we have a variation of minus 
43.7%.  
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the average of EU-15 (Regime 4), favouring middle-income earners9. On the opposite, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, have improved the relative 
situation of the poorest households, and substantially so, at the expense of middle-income 
earners whose relative position with respect to the wealthiest households decreased 
(Regime 2). Finland, the Netherlands and Portugal are all in Regime 3, witnessing a 
deterioration in the situations of low-income and middle-income earners, at the benefit of 
the wealthiest. Among the countries of the EU-15 only Austria, Germany and Italy were 
able to reduce both types of income inequality. However, the latter two are far from the 
45° line for which the improvements in the two objectives would be comparable: 
Germany made more efforts for the poorest than it did to increase the contribution of the 
wealthiest to the tax and benefit system; the reverse is true for Italy. 
To sum up, countries are quite evenly distributed across the four regimes and, except in 
Austria, Germany and Italy, the progressivity of the tax system decreased between 1998 
and 2001 and with it, the efficiency of automatic stabilisers on the side of public receipts.  
One can also assess progressivity by looking at marginal tax rates. Table 5 reports 
marginal tax rates for top-wage earners in a few European countries in 2000 and 2003. 
The decrease was sharp in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Spain. A smoother 
decrease occurred in Germany and Italy. Table 6 displays corporate tax rates in EU-15 
countries in 1990, 2000 and 2005. Except in Spain, corporate tax rates have decreased 
since 1990 or 2000. These reductions are generally meant, in a language that would not 
hurt the European Commission, to enhance production, incentives and entrepreneurship. 
In the short run, lower corporate tax rates may induce higher profitability that may fuel 
investment and employment. Nevertheless, they may also induce to distribute more 
profits which may then be invested elsewhere in the world economy and which may be 
missing for financing the benefit system. The decreasing size of the government may thus 
impair economic stability, as Fatas and Mihov (2001) argued (cf. supra), but it may also 
fuel social unrest. This may be all the more true if marginal tax rates on dividends are 
also reduced and this is what occurred between 2000 and 2003 in Belgium, France, 
Spain, Luxembourg and Ireland (table 7). Moreover, if lower corporate taxes do not 
                                                 
9 The situation of the “middle-class” in these societies is well beyond the scope of this contribution 
which intends to give some macroeconomic and microeconomic clues on the efficiency of automatic 
stabilisers. By “middle-income earners”, we only refer to Decile 5. It is possible that the “middle-class” 
starts at, say, Decile 4 or 6 and, were it the case, conclusions related to the possible improvement or 
deterioration vis-à-vis the “upper-class” (also to be strictly defined) might be different.  
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succeed in fuelling production and growth, the consequent rise in public deficits in 
Europe may push governments to reduce transfers and other public expenditures; in this 
sense, lower taxes may have as a side effect the reduction of automatic stabilisation.  
Possible tensions on public finances because of lower taxes do not come exclusively from 
corporate tax rates: taxes on labour incomes have also decreased in the recent past (table 
8). Only Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Finland, Greece and Sweden, have not 
witnessed such a decrease. Apart from these countries, tax cuts are general and they may 
have a bad influence on the efficiency of future automatic stabilisers. The latter are also 
currently hurt by the implementation of the OECD Employment Strategy: Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and UK all experienced declining 
replacement rates and/or shortened benefit duration.  
After describing the revenue side of automatic stabilization, in the next subsection we 
turn to the expenditure side, more precisely to the analysis of unemployment benefits. 
1.2.3. Unemployment expenditures 
Some items of public spending, in particular those linked to the support of the 
unemployed, help to balance the consequences of shocks. A negative shock on aggregate 
demand is partly dampened by generous unemployment benefits which sustain 
consumption of those most dramatically hit by the shock. More active unemployment 
public expenditures – those labelled under the heading of active labour market policies 
(ALMP), mostly training – also reduce the costs of unemployment for the unemployed, 
promoting their employability and improving their probability of finding a new job, thus 
shortening unemployment duration. Expenditure aimed at fighting unemployment can 
help to maintain economic stability through a combination of supportive measures for the 
demand for labour and enhancing the effective supply of labour.  
Consequently, we use the sum of passive and active unemployment public expenditures 
although the different choices between the two types of expenditures by EU countries 
may produce different lags in the stabilisation properties of unemployment expenditures: 
passive expenditures like benefits undoubtedly impinge quicker on the aggregate demand 
than active expenditures which are meant to reduce the duration of unemployment for 
those unemployed. However, in some EU countries, the decrease of unemployment 
benefits cannot be separated from the increase of ALMP.  
In general, the responsiveness of unemployment expenditures to the unemployment rate 
has decreased, thus reducing the stabilising properties of the system. Figure 3 displays 
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pairs of yearly variations10 in unemployment public expenditures (active and passive 
expenditures) and yearly variations in unemployment rates, for the EU-15 countries, 
distinguishing two samples: 1991-1997 and 1998-2003.11  
Within this figure, we expect pairs to be evenly distributed on an upward line whose 
slope would reveal the average elasticity of unemployment expenditures to the 
unemployment rate. There is actually a very interesting pattern in Europe: since 1998, the 
elasticity of unemployment public expenditures to the unemployment rate has been lower 
than before (0.1 rather than 0.2 on average). Stated differently, the relationship between 
variations in unemployment expenditures and rates was more positively sloped in the 
preceding period despite the Maastricht public finance criteria.  
It is also noteworthy that the level of unemployment expenditures for the same rate of 
unemployment has decreased since 1998, in comparison with the preceding period. This 
latter property of the European social system appears clearly in the cases of Italy, France 
and Germany (figure 4). The UK is an outlier in this respect: With the exception of one 
point in the 1998-2003 sample, the relationship between unemployment expenditures and 
unemployment rate has hardly changed.  
The stylised facts on the reduction of tax rates, the reduction in the progressivity of the 
tax and benefit systems, and the reduction in the generosity of the unemployment 
insurance system, all seem to point unequivocally towards a decrease of the effectiveness 
of automatic stabilisation in European countries.  
Therefore, public deficits may be less and less cyclical, or less and less able to dampen 
fluctuations. In the literature, usual assessments (e.g., Girouard and André, 2005) report 
elasticities of taxes, transfer payments and other expenditures to GDP growth which have 
generally remained constant over time. Looking at unemployment expenditures only, it is 
however possible to suggest that for most of EU countries their relationship with GDP 
growth rate has changed substantially since the end of the 1990s.  
                                                 
10 With a short sample it is not possible to perform a panel test with fixed effects, so that we chose the 
specification in first differences to remove country effects.  
11 The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 made clear that the transition period towards the adoption of the Euro 
would not be followed by a benign-neglect attitude towards public deficits: the convergence criterion of a 
public deficit below 3-percentage points of GDP was soon to become a rule of conduct within the newly 
constituted Euro area. 
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Figure 5 shows a dramatic change in the slope and the level of unemployment 
expenditures (in percentage points of GDP) versus the rate of economic growth12. In 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden, a positive slope 
emerged at the end of the 1990s: unemployment expenditures became procyclical. 
Moreover, for a given GDP growth rate, expenditures are substantially inferior to their 
level of the early 1990s, ranging from a loss of 0.5 percentage point of GDP (Austria, 
between 1993 and 2002), to a loss of 1.5 point (the Netherlands, between 1996 and 
2000). In Germany and Spain, the negative slope has increased since 1999: the effect at 
the margin of the changes on the rate of economic growth on unemployment expenditures 
has decreased. Moreover, in Spain, for a given GDP growth rate, expenditures were 1 
percentage point lower between 1990 and 2001. Exceptions are France whose negative 
slope has been decreasing since 2001, Greece whose a-cyclicity is obvious, Italy whose 
negative slope has been maintained but the level of unemployment expenditures for a 
given GDP growth rate has been lowered, and Portugal and the UK for which the 
deterioration of the automatic stabilisers occurred between 1993 and 1999 for the former 
and between 1991 and 1996 for the latter.  
3. How to Substitute For Automatic Stabilisation? 
If the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers has decreased, as we documented in the 
previous section, we need to ask whether something else could allow the system to adjust. 
In fact, it may be argued; e.g. by the promoters of the Classical School, that in a 
competitive world, where markets (for labour, goods and services or finance) are highly 
flexible, prices adjust rapidly to bring output fluctuations under control. The operation of 
automatic stabilisers could thus turn out to be less necessary than in the past. 
Although the above-mentioned argument is common among economists who promote 
more flexibility and “structural reforms” in Europe (see e.g. Sapir et al., 2003), it needs to 
be supported by identifiable empirical facts. In the vein of McConnell and Perez-Quiros 
(2000), who documented the decline of US output volatility, we study output volatility in 
Euro area countries taken as a whole, and in some EU-15 countries taken individually. 
We remove the mean of GDP growth from yearly GDP growth rates; we then fit a 
constant and a linear trend to the ensuring gap; and we perform a CUSUM and CUSUM 
                                                 
12 Here we assume that the relationship between the unemployment rate and economic growth has 
remained unchanged.  
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of squares test on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals13. The CUSUM of 
squares test reports possible instability in the variance of the parameters.  
For the Euro area taken as a whole, parameter instability occurs only around the German 
reunification years. Nevertheless, although not statistically significant, parameter 
instability had been on an upward slope since 1985 and until 1991. The CUSUM of 
squares test for the Euro area detects statistically significant instability in the variance 
during the crisis of 1993. Movements outside the critical lines, which are suggestive of 
variance instability, are also revealed in the UK from 1975 to 2000, in Italy from 1978 to 
1986, in the Netherlands from 1980 to 1997, and in Sweden from 1981 to 1998 (figure 6). 
Over the recent years, like the US, Europe seems to have experienced a decline in output 
volatility. 
Nevertheless, contrary to what happened in the United States, the decreased variability in 
Europe happened against a background of soft growth through the 1990s, with the largest 
European countries, notably Germany and Italy, which experienced growth rates close to 
zero (in 2002-3) and significantly below the EU average. In a context of low growth, it is 
not surprising that the variability of growth decreased. To eliminate the effect of 
changing growth trends, we detrended the series and analyzed the behaviour of cyclical 
components. We used the filter proposed by Iacobucci and Noullez (2005) that over short 
samples has a better performance with respect to more widely used filters (like Baxter-
King or Hodrick-Prescott). Figure 7 shows the cyclical components of real GDP for the 
euro area for a number of frequency bands, from medium (6-3 years) to very short (1 year 
– 6 months) cycles. A visual inspection shows that, in particular for the 6-3 year band, we 
observe an increase in variability in the early 1970s, and in the early 1990s, two periods 
of macroeconomic turbulence. Nevertheless, the picture shows no clear reduction in 
variability in recent periods, no matter what frequency we examine. To obtain a less 
impressionist assessment, we computed, for each of the frequency bands, the standard 
errors of two subperiods of equal length (1970Q3 to 1988Q2, and 1988Q3 to 2006Q2). 
The results, reported in figure 8, show that for all the frequencies (except the very long 
cycles 18-6 years) the variability in the second period is slightly larger than in the first. 
Using a cut-off between the periods linked to institutional changes (for example the 
                                                 
13 A well-known drawback with a CUSUM test based upon recursive residuals is that a shift late in a 
sample is likely to go relatively unnoticed. A CUSUM test using OLS residuals gives better results for late-
sample data, but none of the tests can be considered significantly superior to the other (Ploberger and 
Krämer, 1992).  
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Single European Act of 1986, or the Maastricht Treaty of 1992), does not alter 
significantly our findings, which are also robust to detrending the series with the HP 
filter. Furthermore, this cyclical pattern is confirmed for most individual countries, with 
the exception of the UK14.  
Finally, we may notice that, contrary to the US, the EU countries are confronted with a 
very specific policy architecture which leaves monetary and fiscal policy uncoordinated, 
which fetters domestic fiscal policies and whose federal budget is both small (1 
percentage point of EU-25 GNP) and not allowed to contribute to stabilising the 
economies. 
Thus, we can conclude that the likely occurrence of asymmetric shocks in the EU and the 
institutional framework question the belief that increasing flexibility will be sufficient to 
assure income stabilisation (especially when average growth will go back to more 
standard levels). In the next section we argue that in light of a number of recent articles 
on the subject, and of the decreased efficiency of automatic stabilisation described above, 
discretionary fiscal policy should be reconsidered as a possible tool for economic 
stabilisation, either to dampen output fluctuations or to sustain potential output through 
public investment expenditures.  
4. A Role for Discretionary Policy 
The institutional framework that rules the economic governance of Europe, restricting 
fiscal policy to the working of automatic stabilisers, is not fortuitous, as it stems quite 
logically from the widespread aversion of the academic profession for discretionary fiscal 
policy, which emerged over the 1980s and 1990s. Four main sets of arguments have been 
advanced to justify this aversion: the first is that discretionary fiscal policy is subject to a 
number of delays (from decision to implementation) that make it impossible to use it to 
react to shocks. By the time the effects of policy are felt, the shock it was supposed to 
address may have vanished. These arguments were, among others, at the roots of the shift 
of attention from fiscal to monetary policy as the main stabilisation tool. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by Blinder (2006), while the inside lags are larger for fiscal policy, the 
outside lags are much longer for monetary policy. Furthermore, the inside lags have 
nothing to do with fiscal policy per se, but rather with institutions that are not always 
well adapted. Arestis and Sawyer (2003) made a slightly different point: they recalled 
that monetary policy “being less subject to democratic decision making”, it does not need 
                                                 
14 Figures are not reported. They are available from the authors upon request.  
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Parliamentary approval. For this reason, monetary policy can be decided and 
implemented quickly whereas expenditure changes generally take much longer. Blinder 
(2006) notes that the arguments on implementation or inside lags do not hold for 
particular items of fiscal policy, like temporary tax cuts, that proved very effective in 
changing the intertemporal allocation of resources by the private sector. Arestis and 
Sawyer (2003) further point out that the adoption of a fiscal policy rule in the vein of the 
monetary “Taylor rule”, i.e. with reference to deviations of economic activity from the 
desired level, would contribute to reducing inside lags.  
The second set of arguments against discretionary fiscal policy deals with its 
effectiveness, originating from the rational expectations revolution, and the Lucas’ 
Critique (Lucas, 1976). First, a fiscal expansion may crowd out private expenditure (in 
particular investment) up to a point at which the overall increase in income becomes 
negligible. This may happen because the deficit is financed through borrowing, thus 
increasing interest rates and the cost of investment; or because public spending is aimed 
at moving the economy away from some sort of optimal or “natural” position, so that 
rational consumers react in order to bring the system back to its natural level. A weaker 
version of this argument focuses on the intertemporal budget constraint of rational 
consumers, who anticipate future tax increases to repay for current deficits, and hence 
react by increasing their current savings and reducing their expenditure (the Ricardian 
equivalence, see Barro, 1974)15. 
A third argument against fiscal policy discretion, made popular by the recent experience 
in the US, is the twin deficits hypothesis; based on the national accounting identity it is 
possible to show that an increase in budget deficit may create an equivalent deficit of the 
current account, so that total domestic income may not increase, and the expansionary 
effect may benefit other countries through increased imports16. 
Finally, fiscal policy may be inflationary, if it succeeds in improving economic activity 
(thus increasing imports and putting downward pressure on the exchange rate) and reduce 
                                                 
15 A strand of the literature, that on “expansionary fiscal contractions”, has largely stemmed from a mix 
of this equivalence and credibility issues influencing risk premia (see Hemming et al., 2002, for a general 
survey; and Creel et al., 2004, for a critical one).  
16 It must be acknowledged that though twin deficit is an accounting identity (under the assumption of 
constant net private savings), at another level it tends to be seen as ‘budget deficits cause current account 
deficits’. It is worth distinguishing between the formal accounting position and the causal relationship 
which is often postulated. We discuss below that empirical evidence on the causal relationships has not 
been convincing so far. 
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unemployment. In a globalised world financial markets may react withdrawing funds 
from the economy and causing a financial crisis. 
Theoretical counter arguments or empirical weaknesses may be found for each of these 
reasons against the use of discretionary fiscal policy as a tool for stabilisation. As a 
general first point, we can observe that these arguments are not necessarily coherent with 
each other: If there is crowding out then neither inflation nor twin deficits will appear. 
Going more into detail, it does not seem that the link deficit-interest rate-private spending 
is as robust as it would seem at first sight. First, a good policy mix can allow to increase 
borrowing without significant increases in interest rates. This may explain why past 
evidence that increases in the public debt were correlated with rises in interest rates is 
weak (see, e.g. Heilbroner and Bernstein, 1989). Furthermore, the empirical link between 
interest rates and private spending (in particular investment) is also weak (see, e.g. 
Fazzari, 1994-95, Ducoudré, 2005). 
Another reason for the empirical weakness of the crowding out argument is the extremely 
restrictive set of assumptions on which Ricardian equivalence builds. If consumers for 
whatever reason do not discount the future perfectly, or if public expenditure is 
productive, and increases the future tax base, then there is no a priori reason for 
crowding out. A very simple model can also precisely highlight two other shortcomings 
of the Ricardian argument: it also assumes public spending irresponsibility and very few 
liquidity-constrained households. 
Take an economy in which a proportion μ  of households are liquidity constrained. As in 
Hayashi (1982) and Campbell and Mankiw (1990), liquidity-constrained individuals 
cannot borrow or lend, so that they consume all their disposable income in each period. 
The economy lasts 2 periods. In the first (“Keynesian”), demand drives production, while 
in the second (“Classical”) the contrary holds. Without investment, the usual demand 
equations hold: 
1 1 1
2
,      (1)
y               (2)
y c G
y
= +
=  
where subscripts refer to time periods, y is production or demand, c is private 
consumption and G are public expenditures.  
Unconstrained individuals smooth consumption over their entire horizon: their 
consumption depends on their permanent income. They maximise their intertemporal 
utility function subject to the usual intertemporal budget constraint: 
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1 2
1 2
ln( ) ln( )
. .
Max u c c
s t c c R
= +β
+ =  
where 1 2 1 2( )R y y T T= + − +  is lifetime income, defined as the sum of disposable 
incomes, β  is the discount factor, and T  is total taxes on individuals. To simplify the 
exposition and without loss of generality, a zero interest rate on savings and a constant 
intertemporal price of consumption are assumed. Under perfect foresight, the solution 
gives: 
1
2
1
1
1
c R
c R
= +β
β= +β
(3) 
Aggregate consumption of liquidity-constrained and unconstrained individuals in period 
1 thus writes: 
1 1 1
1( ) (1 ) (4)
1
c y T R= μ − + −μ +β . 
The government has an intertemporal budget constraint (BC): 0 1 2 1 2B G G T T+ + = + , 
where 0B  represents the initial level of public debt in the economy.  
Following Perotti (1999), present and future public expenditures are assumed to 
be correlated; i.e. they follow an inertial process whose strength depends on the value of 
ρ:  
2 1 (5)G G G= +ρ , 
where G
−
 are discretionary expenditures in period 2.  
Defining 0B G+ = Γ  , the BC becomes: 
1 1 2(1 ) (6)G T TΓ + +ρ = + . 
At equilibrium, production writes:  
1 1 1 (7)y G c= +  
Substituting (4) in (7) gives: 
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( )
( )
1 1 1 1 1 2 1
1 1 2
(1 )( ) (1 )
1
(8)
(1 ) 1 1
(1 ) (1 )
y G y T y y G
G T y
−μ= +μ − + + −Γ − +ρ+β
β+μ −ρ −μ +β= −μ + −Γβ −μ β −μ β
 
from which the multiplier effect of public spending on short-run GDP can be computed: 
1
1
0 (1 )y
G
∂ < ⇔ ρ −μ > β+μ∂ . It is then straightforward to show that non-Keynesian (NK) 
effects occur if and only if:  
(9)
1
ρ−βμ < +ρ . 
Intuitively, in this extreme framework, if an increase in expenditure today is perceived as 
permanent, and consumers are not patient enough, then G  crowds out private 
expenditure and has negative effects on income. NK effects would thus appear if the 
degree of persistence of fiscal policy is larger than the discount factor: long-lasting 
expenditure cuts would improve permanent income as individuals would expect lower 
taxes in period 2. There are a number of reasons for considering that condition (9) cannot 
be met. First, it is really tricky to obtain: with a share of liquidity-constrained households 
(μ ) equal to one third, and a discount factor (β ) equal to 0.95, the degree of persistence 
in public expenditures necessary to yield NK effect would have to be extremely high 
( 1.95ρ ≥ ). Second, as the fraction of liquidity-constrained agents approaches to 1, the 
area of NK effects decreases. Therefore, assuming NK effects is equivalent to assuming 
the existence of Ricardian consumers; however, the empirical validity of the second 
assumption is very disputable (see Ricciuti, 2003, for a recent assessment and survey of 
the literature). Third, a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to satisfy inequality (9) 
is ρ > β . This condition would become sufficient only if there were perfect consumption 
smoothing ( 0μ = ), but again the literature holds that this is rather implausible.  
If crowding out is not an automatic consequence of running a deficit, then the current 
account argument has to be reconsidered as well. Twin deficits are not an empirical 
regularity, and in fact seem to be more of a long run national accounting phenomenon, 
than a property that holds over the cycle when the ex ante equality between investment 
and savings is not necessarily guaranteed. Moreover, the US current account imbalances 
started in 1992-93, at a time when public deficits were sharply declining. Finally, there is 
no convincing evidence that financial markets react to “normal” rates of inflation, and at 
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the same time, in a situation of financial distress contractionary fiscal policies do not 
seem a viable solution, as proven recently by Argentina. 
Beyond the “critique to the critique”, there are two prominent reasons for defending 
discretionary fiscal policy: First, a recent strand of literature, started by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), confirms that the empirical evidence is unable to rule out a positive role 
for discretionary fiscal policy. If anything, it generally shows significant short term 
effects and also, in some studies, a significant effect in the long-run (the multiplier values 
for some of these papers are reported in table 9). Second, Taylor (2000) has shown that 
lower efficiency of automatic stabilisers in the US, assessed by the estimated response of 
the cyclical surplus to the output gap, has been compensated by a “rather sizeable 
countercyclical” discretionary stance. A similar exercise was conducted by Farvaque et 
al. (2006) on EU countries, but results in terms of countercyclical discretionary stance 
were much less pronounced than in the US case. 
The papers in the vein of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) borrow from the structural VAR 
methodology. Very simple reduced form VAR models are estimated, and then the 
identification is obtained by imposing to the contemporaneous residual correlation matrix 
a number of constraints that originate in the institutional system, in estimated elasticities, 
and so on. Contrary to Taylor’s methodology, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) have 
attempted to extract purely discretionary fiscal components. They did not use computed 
structural deficits which rely on estimations of the output gap and the biases they are 
associated with. Moreover, the discretionary stance has been corrected for interest 
payments.  
The impulse response functions for these exercises usually show short term Keynesian 
effects across countries (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2004; Biau and Girard, 
2005; Giordano et al., 2006). Perotti (2004) is an exception in this respect: he found low 
and even negative fiscal spending multipliers in the short run in the UK, Australia, and 
Canada, depending on the sample (1960-2000, 1960-79, 1980-2000). Creel et al. 
(2007a,b) recently extended this methodology by imposing longer run constraints 
(namely through the introduction of a debt accumulation equation); neglecting these 
constraints, as done in the existing literature did not seem justified, especially when 
trying to assess the effect of public investment. They show that, if the long term 
interaction between debt, fiscal policy and monetary policy is not artificially shut off, the 
long run multiplier remains significantly positive and equal to 2 in France after a 
discretionary shock on the primary deficit and to 3 in the UK after a discretionary shock 
on public investment.  
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It is therefore possible to conclude that, on empirical grounds, a discretionary fiscal 
policy has a positive and persistent impact on output. From a short run perspective, it also 
means that this policy has an impact on long-run economic growth, hence it has an 
impact on potential output. This empirical conclusion is consistent with a strand of the 
literature which argues that the natural rate of growth is sensitive to aggregate demand 
(see, e.g. Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2002) or with papers which argue that fiscal 
contractions impinge negatively on potential output, since “the failure to use 
expansionary fiscal policy when slack resources exist could lead to a prolonged period of 
wasted economic potential” (Fazzari, 1994-95, p. 245).  
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we highlighted a contradiction between the spirit of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, and the actual behaviour of fiscal policies in Europe. On the one hand the former is 
designed with the objective to rule out any discretion in the conduct of fiscal policy, thus 
leaving to automatic stabilisation the exclusive burden of countercyclical policy; on the 
other hand, though, a number of stylized facts that we reported in the paper point to a 
significant decrease of the role of automatic stabilisation. Progressivity of the tax system 
and the size of the public sector have been reduced in most European countries, and 
structural breaks in the sensitivity of public spending to GDP changes appeared in the 
1990s. 
Thus, even if we were to adhere to the principles behind the setting chosen by European 
countries to rule economic policy, and we gave importance only on automatic 
stabilisation, we would be forced to admit that nowadays fiscal policy in the EMU is 
mostly dysfunctional17.  
We believe that this moment of crisis may actually be an opportunity. The debate opened 
at the beginning of this decade on the flaws of the Stability Pact has been closed by the 
reform of 2005 that took it out of the political agenda. Maybe that reform was too hasty, 
and what is needed is a more radical rethinking of the framework for fiscal policy. This 
paper and the small illustrative model that we presented suggest that a reformed fiscal 
rule for Europe should leave some room for discretionary policy. In particular we believe 
                                                 
17 Andres et al. (2008) show that government size and the volatility of output are negatively correlated, 
arguing then that this stylised fact cannot be replicated in a real-business cycle model. They conclude that 
“models with Keynesian features can better replicate the empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy 
on the volatility of output fluctuations”. Nevertheless, they do not conclude that a fiscal framework where 
automatic stabilisers are made less and less efficient is dysfunctional.  
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that the countries of the Euro area should learn from the successful experience of the UK 
(see Creel, Monperrus Veroni and Saraceno, 2007), and implement some form of “golden 
rule” to encourage long term public spending (investment, but also expenditure on crucial 
items like public health and education), without hampering the long term sustainability of 
public finances. 
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6. Appendix: tables and graphs 
Table 1. Effectiveness of automatic stabilisers across EU countries (in %) 
 Bundesbank 
model 
(1) 
QUEST 
model 
(2) 
NiGEM 
model 
(3) 
INTERLINK 
model 
(4) 
France 19 23 7 14 
Italy 14 21 5 23 
Netherlands 14 20 6 36 
UK 24 18 n.a. 30 
Germany 23 17 18 31 
Unweighted 
average  
 
18.8 
 
19.8 
 
9.0 
 
26.8 
Std error 4.8 2.4 6.1 8.5 
Note: percentage of fluctuations in output which are smoothed by automatic stabilisers. 
Sources: (1) Scharnagl and Tödter (2004); (2) European Commission (2001); Barrel and 
Pina (2004); van den Noord (2000). 
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Table 2. Automatic stabilisers  
Dependent variable: government net lending in percent of GDP, 1971-2005 
 Ita. Fra. UK Nld. Swe. 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
ΔGDP-1  -0.28 
(0.9) 
-0.26 
(1.9) 
0.79 
(5.4) 
0.28 
(1.9) 
0.52 
(2.6) 
0.25 
(1.7) 
0.53 
(2.8) 
0.34 
(2.5) 
1.32 
(3.3) 
0.75 
(2.7) 
Gvt net lend.-1  - 0.89 
(11.6) 
- 0.64 
(5.1) 
- 0.68 
(5.3) 
- 0.68 
(6.7) 
- 0.69 
(6.5) 
Const -7.0 
(7.5) 
-0.19 
(0.3) 
-4.3 
(10.5) 
-1.6 
(2.6) 
-4.3 
(6.9) 
-1.5 
(2.3) 
-4.0 
(7.1) 
-1.9 
(3.5) 
-3.1 
(2.8) 
-1.7 
(2.3) 
²R
−
 
 
0.00 
 
0.81 
 
0.46 
 
0.70 
 
0.14 
 
0.55 
 
0.17 
 
0.64 
 
0.22 
 
0.66 
Note: t-stat are reported between brackets.  
Source OECD, Economic Outlook. 
 
Table 3. General government size in the EU (in % of GDP) 
  1980 1990 2000 2006
Total expenditure 45.6 49.6 51.6 53.5 France 
Total revenue 45.7 47.2 50.2 50.8 
Total expenditure 40.8 52.9 46.2 49.5 Italy 
Total revenue 33.8 41.5 45.3 44.9 
Total expenditure 55.4 54.2 44.2 46.6 Netherlands 
Total revenue 51.5 48.9 46.1 46.5 
Total expenditure 47.4 41.5 36.9 44.6 UK 
Total revenue 41.7 39.9 40.8 41.7 
Total expenditure  72.4(1) 56.8 55.6 Sweden 
Total revenue  61.1(1) 61.8 58.4 
Total expenditure 47.9 44.5 45.1 45.8 Germany 
Total revenue 45.0 42.5 46.4 43.5 
Source: European Commission, Economic Forecasts, Autumn 2006.  
(1): 1993 
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Table 4. Reduction of interdecile inequality after fiscal and social transfers, in percentage 
points 
 D5/D1 D10/D5 
 1998 2001 1998 2001 
EU-15* -43.7 -42.0 -31.1 -32.4 
France -40.1 -37.6 -29.0 -29.4 
Germany -59.5 -63.7 -30.4 -30.6 
Italy -16.7 -17.2 -25.7 -28.7 
Netherlands -59.3 -58.4 -28.1 -23.1 
Spain -27.9 -40.8 -41.2 -30.8 
Ireland -91.7 -90.2 -33.0 -41.7 
UK* -76.4 -76.0 -35.1 -35.2 
*: euros adjusted for PPP. 
Sources: EUROMOD statistics on Distribution and Decomposition of Disposable 
Income, accessed at www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emodstats/DecompStats.pdf on 1998 and 
2001 using EUROMOD version 31A; computations by the authors.  
 
Table 5. Marginal tax rates for top-wage earners*, in percentage points 
 2000 2003  2000 2003 
Belgium 60.5 53.5 Spain 48.0 45.0 
France 61.2 56.1 Luxembourg 47.1 38.9 
Germany 53.8 51.2 Ireland 44.0 42.0 
Italy 46.4 45.9 UK 40.0 40.0 
*: top wages are at least equal to twelve times in 2000 and 10 times in 2003 the average 
production wage.  
Source: OECD, Recent Tax Policy Trends and Reforms in OECD countries, 2004, 
reproduced from Saint-Etienne & Le Cacheux (2005, p.21). 
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Table 6. Corporate tax rates, in percentage points 
 1990 2000* 2005  1990 2000* 2005
Austria 30  25 Ireland 43 (10: 
industry) 
24 12.5 
Belgium 43 40.2 35.5 Italy 36 37 33 
Denmark 50  28 Luxembourg 34 37.5 30.4 
Finland 33  26 Netherlands 35  31.5 
France 42 (distributed 
profit) 
37 (retained 
profit) 
37.8 34.9 Portugal 34  27.5 
Germany 36 (distributed 
profit) 
50 (retained 
profit) 
52 39.3 Spain 35 35 35 
Greece 46 (40: 
industry) 
 32 Sweden 52  28 
EU-15 41.8  34.1 UK 35 30 30 
Sources: European Tax Handbook, reproduced from Sterdyniak (2005, p.24), except year 
2000 reproduced from Saint-Etienne & Le Cacheux (2005, p.22).  
 
Table 7. Marginal tax rates for dividends, in percentage points 
 2000 2003  2000 2003 
Belgium 49.1 43.9 Spain 52.7 50.0 
France 63.2 57.0 Luxembourg 52.3 44.0 
Germany 53.8 55.5 Ireland 57.4 49.3 
Italy 45.9 46.1 UK 47.5 47.5 
Source: OECD, Recent Tax Policy Trends and Reforms in OECD countries, 2004, 
reproduced from Saint-Etienne & Le Cacheux (2005, p.23). 
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Table 8. Structural reforms on the labour markets, 1994-2004 
 Replacement rate Benefit duration Taxes on labour incomes 
Austria [+, -]  + 
Belgium  + + 
Denmark + + - 
Finland [+, -]  [+, -] 
France - + + 
Germany [+, -] + + 
Greece   [+, -] 
Ireland +  + 
Italy -  + 
Luxembourg   + 
Netherlands  + + 
Portugal   + 
Spain + - + 
Sweden [+, -]  [+, -] 
UK  + + 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, 2006. 
Note: +: reforms have been implemented in the direction of the OECD Employment 
Strategy; 
-: reforms have been implemented counter to the OECD Employment Strategy; [+, -] 
reforms have gone in both directions.  
 
Table 9. Fiscal multipliers in the recent literature 
 Country Multiplier of … 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) USA expenditure = [0.9; 1.3]  (short run) 
USA expenditure = [0.1;0.7]   (short run) 
= [-1.3;1.0]  (long run) 
Germany expenditure = [0.8;1.3]   (short run) 
= [-0.7;1.1]  (long run) 
UK expenditure = [-0.2;0.5]  (short run) 
= [-1.1;0.8]  (long run) 
Canada expenditure = [0.1;0.6]   (short run) 
= [-2.2;0.9]  (long run) 
 
 
 
 
Perotti (2004) 
Australia expenditure = [0.0;0.6]   (short run) 
= [0.2;0.6]   (long run) 
Biau and Girard (2005) France expenditure  = 1.4            (short run) 
= 1.8            (long run) 
Giordano et al. (2006) Italy expenditure = 1.7            (short run) 
Creel et al. (2007a) France primary balance = 0.8            (short run) 
= 2.0            (long run) 
Creel et al. (2007b) UK investment = 3.1           (long run) 
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Figure 1. 
Stability of automatic stabilisers 
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Figure 2. Evolution of interdecile disposable income between 1998 and 2001,  
EU 15 
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Notes: Regime 1: improvement in the two objectives; Regime 2: improvement in 
objective 1, deterioration in objective 2; Regime 3: deterioration in the two objectives; 
Regime 4: improvement in objective 2, deterioration in objective 1; Objective 1: reducing 
inequality for low-income earners; Objective 2: increasing the contribution effort of high-
income earners.  
Source: EUROMOD (see table 1), computations by the authors. 
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Figure 3. Relationships between the variation in unemployment public expenditures 
(expressed in percentage points of GDP) and the variation in unemployment rate, both 
stated in %, EU 15, 1991-1997 and 1998-2003 
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Source: OECD, computations by the authors.  
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Figure 4. Relationships between unemployment public expenditures (expressed 
in percentage points of GDP) and unemployment rate, 4 main EU-15 countries, 1991-
1997 and 1998-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, computations by the authors.  
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Figure 5. Relationships between unemployment public expenditures (expressed in 
percentage points of GDP) and GDP growth rate 
 
Source: OECD, computations by the authors.  
0 3
02
01
00
9 9
9 8
9 7
96
95
94
9 3
92
91
9 0
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2 ,5 3 ,5
GDP growth rate
Unemployment expenditures
BELGIUM
03
0201
00
99 98
9 7
969 5
94
93
92
9 1
9 0
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 ,5 1,5
GDP growth rate
Unemployment expenditures
AUSTRIA
03
0 2
0 1
0 0
99 98 9 7
9 6
95
94
93
9 2
91
9 0
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 ,5 1,5
GDP growth rate
Unemployment expenditures
GERMANY
90 9 1
9 2
9 3
94
95
9 6
97
98
99
0 0
01
02
03
-0 ,5
0 ,5
1,5
2 ,5
3 ,5
4 ,5
5,5
2 ,5 3 ,5 4 ,5 5,5
GDP growth rate
Unemployment expenditures
DENMARK
9 0
91
92
93
94959 6
9 7
98
9 9
00
01
0203
-6 ,5
-5,5
-4 ,5
-3 ,5
-2 ,5
-1,5
-0 ,5
0 ,5
1,5
2 ,5
3 ,5
4 ,5
5,5
6 ,5
1 2 3 4 5
GDP growth rate
Unemployment expenditures
FINLAND
0302
0 1
0 0
99
98
97
9 6
95
9 4
9 3
92
9 1
9 0
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1 2
GDP growth rate
Unemployment expenditures
FRANCE
 36
Figure 5. [continued] 
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Figure 5. [continued] 
 
 
Figure 6. Real GDP growth rates, 1970:1-2006:2 
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Figure 6. [continued] 
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Figure 6. [continued] 
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Figure 7. Cyclical components for the Euro area real GDP; selected frequencies 
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Source: OECD. Series obtained using the Iacobucci and Noullez (2005) filter. 
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Figure 8. Standard error of the filtered series at different frequencies. Two subsamples of 
equal length. 
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Source: OECD; series obtained using the Iacobucci and Noullez (2005) filter. 
Calculations of the authors 
 
 
 
